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Introduction 
Evidence is anything that demonstrates, clarifies or 
shows the truth of a fact or point in question. Traditionally 
there has been resistance to the acceptance of new 
forms of evidence that emerge as a result of evolving 
technology. For instance, in the thirteenth century, 
Emperor Frederick II proclaimed instruments written on 
paper to be invalid.1  Eventually however, parchment 
was replaced by paper in general use, and hand written 
paper documents were accepted as evidence in courts. 
Later, with the introduction of typewriters, many lawyers 
failed to understand the technology and failed to obtain 
expert evidence giving rise to problems of authenticating 
the typewritten document.2  A similar phenomenon is 
occurring today with respect to electronic documents. 
Information technology (IT) has become very much a 
part of the fabric of life. Specific legislation has been 
necessary to address issues arising from the application 
of technology in various areas of human endeavour. 
The law of evidence has had to take cognizance of this, 
because computer generated evidence (digital evidence) 
has frequently to be collected from various sources, 
even extra jurisdictional, for use in legal proceedings. 
Amendments to the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950 in 1993 
provided for the admissibility of computer generated 
documents. This paper examines the legal framework 
for the admissibility of digital evidence in Malaysia and 
discusses a series of cases highlighting the issues that 
have arisen in this context.
Computer generated evidence under the 
Evidence Act 1950 
By s 3 of the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950 (Evidence Act), 
the word ‘evidence’ includes:
(a) all statements which the court permits or requires 
to be made before it by witnesses in relation to 
matters of fact under inquiry: such statements are 
called oral evidence;
(b) all documents produced for the inspection of the 
court: such documents are called documentary 
evidence;
‘Document’ under the Evidence Act means:
any matter expressed, described or howsoever 
represented, upon any substance, material, thing 
or article, including any matter embodied in a disc, 
tape, film, sound track or other device whatsoever, by 
means of -
(a) letters, figures, marks, symbols, signals, signs, 
or other forms of expression, description, or 
representation whatsoever;
(b) any visual recording (whether of still or moving 
images);
(c) any sound recording, or any electronic magnetic, 
mechanical or other recording whatsoever and 
howsoever made, or any sounds, electronic 
impulses, or other data whatsoever;
(d) a recording, or transmission, over a distance of any 
matter by any, or any combination, of the means 
mentioned in paragraph (a), (b), or (c),
or by more than one of the means mentioned in 
paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d), intended to be used 
or which may be used for the purpose of expressing, 
describing, or howsoever representing, that matter.
Section 3 provides illustrations of what is meant by a 
document; any writing words printed, lithographed 
or photographed; a map, plan, graph or sketch; an 
inscription on wood, metal, stone or any other substance, 
material or thing; a drawing, painting, picture or 
caricature; a photograph or a negative; a tape recording of 
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a telephonic communication, including a recording of such 
communication transmitted over distance; a photographic 
or other visual recording, including a recording of a 
photographic or other visual transmission over a distance; 
a matter recorded, stored, processed, retrieved or 
produced by a computer.
Further, a ‘computer’ is defined as
any device for recording, storing, processing, retrieving 
or producing any information or other matter, or for 
performing any one or more of those functions, by 
whatever name or description such device is called;
However this definition has now been repealed by the 
recent Evidence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 2012 in favour 
of the definition in the Computer Crimes Act 1997 which 
defines ‘computer’ as:
‘An electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, 
or other data processing device, or a group of such 
interconnected or related devices, performing logical, 
arithmetic or storage functions, and includes any data 
storage facility or communications facility directly 
related to or operating in conjunction with such device 
or group of such interconnected or related devices, 
but does not include — 
(a) an automated typewriter or typesetter;
(b) a portable hand held calculator;
(c) a device similar to those referred to in paragraphs 
(a) and (b) which is non-programmable or which 
does not contain any data storage facility.’
Although the two different definitions for ‘computer’ in 
the Computer Crimes Act 1997 and the Evidence Act 1950 
did not give rise to any issues of interpretation in practice, 
the amendment has brought consistency in the definition 
of the term ‘computer’ in both the statutes.
Amendments to the Evidence Act in 1993 provided for 
the admissibility of ‘computer-generated documents’ 
in sections 90A, 90B and 90C. Section 90A is the 
principal section and with seven subsections, sets the 
requirements for admissibility and proof. Section 90B 
deals with the probative value to be attached to the 
evidence, while s 90C stipulates that the provisions 
of sections 90A and 90B shall prevail over any other 
provisions in any other statutes.
Section 90A(1) provides as follows:
(1) In any criminal or civil proceeding a document 
produced by a computer, or a statement contained 
in such document, shall be admissible as evidence 
of any fact stated therein if the document was 
produced by the computer in the course of its 
ordinary use, whether or not the person tendering 
the same is the maker of such document or 
statement.
Section 90A(2) provides:
(2) For the purposes of this section it may be proved 
that a document was produced by a computer in 
the course of its ordinary use by tendering to the 
court a certificate signed by a person who either 
before or after the production of the document by 
the computer is responsible for the management 
of the operation of that computer, or for the 
conduct of the activities for which that computer 
was used.
This provision has caused a great deal of argument on 
whether a certificate is required in every case where 
‘computer generated evidence’ is sought to be adduced. 
The Court of Appeal went to great lengths to examine 
and clarify the provisions in the case of Gnanasegaran 
Pararajasingam v PP [1997] 4CLJ 6, discussed below.
As for the certificate, it shall be sufficient under s 90A (3) 
for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and 
belief of the person stating it. It shall then be admissible 
in evidence as prima facie proof of all matters stated in 
it without proof of signature of the person who gave the 
certificate:
(3) (a) It shall be sufficient, in a certificate given under 
subsection (2), for a matter to be stated to the best 
of the knowledge and belief of the person stating 
it.
(b) A certificate given under subsection (2) shall be 
admissible in evidence as prima facie proof of all 
matters stated in it without proof of signature of 
the person who gave the certificate.
Once the certificate is produced, there is a presumption 
under s 90A(4) that the computer referred to in the 
certificate was in good working order and was operating 
properly in all respects throughout the material part of the 
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period during which the document was produced.3 
By the provisions of s 90A(5), a document is deemed to 
have been produced by a computer, directly or indirectly, 
and whether or not there was any direct or indirect 
human intervention. Section 90A(6) provides a further 
presumption in relation to a document, whether produced 
by a computer or not:
(6) A document produced by a computer, or a 
statement contained in such document, shall 
be admissible in evidence whether or not 
it was produced by the computer after the 
commencement of the criminal or civil proceeding 
or after the commencement of any investigation 
or inquiry in relation to the criminal or civil 
proceeding or such investigation or inquiry, and 
any document so produced by a computer shall 
be deemed to be produced by the computer in the 
course of its ordinary use.
It will be observed that s 90A(1) and s 90A(6) appear 
to be incompatible and inconsistent with each other. 
The ‘deeming’ provision in s (6) was seen as a way of 
circumventing the requirement for the certificate as 
stipulated in s 6(1) until the Federal Court in Ahmad Najib 
Aris v PP [2009] 2 CLJ 800, discussed below, clarified the 
distinction between subsections (1) and (6).
Section 90A(7) provides as follows:
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
section, a document produced by a computer, or 
a statement contained in such document, shall 
not be admissible in evidence in any criminal 
proceeding, where it is given in evidence by or 
on behalf of the person who is charged with an 
offence in such proceeding the person so charged 
with the offence being a person who was—
(a) responsible for the management of the operation 
of that computer or for the conduct of the activities 
for which that computer was used; or
(b) in any manner or to any extent involved, directly 
or indirectly, in the production of the document by 
the computer.
As such, the subsection precludes an accused in any 
criminal proceeding from using self corroborating 
evidence generated by a computer under his own 
management or supervision.
Section 62 provides that ‘Primary evidence means the 
document itself produced for the inspection of the court’. 
A document produced by a computer is primary evidence. 
Thus computer-generated evidence may be admitted 
in court without difficulty and such evidence is primary 
evidence, even though it is not possible to distinguish 
between ‘original’ and ‘copy’. The provisions in s 90A 
ostensibly provide the necessary safeguards.
Section 90B deals with the weight or probative value to 
be attached to a document or statement contained in 
document, admitted by virtue of s 90A:
In estimating the weight, if any, to be attached to a 
document, or a statement contained in a document, 
admitted by virtue of section 90A, the court—
(a) may draw any reasonable inference from 
circumstances relating to the document or the 
statement, including the manner and purpose of 
its creation, or its accuracy or otherwise:
(b) shall have regard to—
(i) the interval of time between the occurrence or 
existence of the facts stated in the document 
or statement, and the supply of the relevant 
information or matter into the computer; and
(ii) whether or not the person who supplies, or 
any person concerned with the supply of, such 
information or the custody of the document, or 
the document containing the statement, had 
any incentive to conceal or misrepresent all 
or any of the facts stated in the document or 
statement.
Challenging the admissibility of computer 
generated evidence 
Gnanasegaran Pararajasingam v PP [1997] 4CLJ 6 was one 
of the early cases where direction was sought from the 
Court of Appeal on the admissibility and probative value 
of computer generated documents. Mahadev Shankar 
JCA, clarified that
‘s. 90A was enacted to bring the “best evidence rule” 
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up to date with the realities of the electronic age. The 
effect of s. 90A(1) in the present scenario is that it is 
no longer necessary to call the actual teller or bank 
clerk who keyed in the data to come to Court provided 
he did so in the course of the ordinary use of the 
computer. This is a relaxation of the direct evidence 
rule in s. 60 beyond the extent to which its provisions 
have been diluted by s. 32(b) in the case of documents 
made in the ordinary course of business. A situation 
could thus arise under s. 90A(1) where the particular 
person who keyed in the information may not be 
individually identifiable, but the document would 
nevertheless be admissible.’
Shaik Daud Ismail JCA further clarified that there were two 
ways of proving ‘in the course of its ordinary use’:
‘(i)  it may be proved by the production of the 
certificate as required by sub-s.(2). – This is 
permissive and not mandatory. This can also be 
seen in sub-s.(4) which begins with the words 
‘Where’ a certificate is given under sub-s.(2)….. or
(ii)  by calling the maker of the document. Therefore a 
certificate is not required to be produced in every 
case.
Once the prosecution adduces evidence through 
a bank officer that the document is produced by a 
computer, it is not incumbent upon them to also 
produce a certificate under sub-s.(2) as sub-s.(6) 
provides that a document produced by a computer 
shall be deemed to be produced by the computer in 
the course of its ordinary use.’
However, despite the clarification from the Court of 
Appeal in Gnanasegaran, these issues continued to arise 
as a means of challenging the admissibility of computer 
generated evidence. In PB Securities S/B v Justin Ong Kian 
Kuok & Anor KL HC [2007] 1 MLJ 153, the plaintiff’s claim 
against the defendant was in respect of contra losses 
incurred in the defendant’s share trading account arising 
from the purchase and sale of shares. The defendant 
contended that he did not give instructions to the remisier 
of the plaintiff’s company to conduct the trading for and 
on his behalf which resulted in losses in the defendant’s 
account, and that the trading was manipulated by the 
remisier. The defendant also alleged that numerous 
transactions were carried out far in excess of the trading 
limit. It was noted that the defendant did not challenge 
them nor lodge a complaint to the plaintiff regarding his 
account at the material time. The plaintiff furnished the 
certificate under s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950, and by 
virtue of s 90A, all the contract notes, contra statements 
and monthly statements were held to be properly 
admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein, 
namely, what shares had been bought and sold by the 
order of the defendant.
It is noted with concern that the mere production of the 
certificate was sufficient to admit all the contract notes, 
contra statements and monthly statements as proof of 
their contents without any concern about authenticity, 
particularly when the defendant disputes the authenticity. 
It should be necessary to examine the monthly 
statements and dispute any discrepancies immediately. 
However, it is interesting to note that in the American 
case of In re Vee Vinhnee, debtor, American Express 
Travel Related Services Co. Inc. v Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 
437 (9th. Cir. BAP 2005), American Express claimed that 
Vinhnee failed to pay credit card debts. The court found 
that American Express had failed to authenticate certain 
digital records. Klien J pointed out that the focus was 
not the circumstances of the creation of the records, but 
the preservation of the record, so as to assure that the 
document being proffered was the same as the document 
that was originally created. He explained that:
‘..…the questions extend beyond the identification of 
the particular computer equipment and programmes 
used. The entity’s policies and procedures for the 
use of the equipment, programmes and database are 
important. How access is controlled, how changes in 
the database are logged or recorded as well as the 
structure and implementation of the back-up systems 
and audit procedures for the continuing integrity of 
the database are pertinent … to whether records have 
been changed since their creation.’4 
In PP v Hanafi Mat Hassan [2003] 6 CLJ 459, the Court 
of Appeal embarked on a detailed examination of the 
provisions of s 90A, highlighting and carefully explaining 
the subtle requirements and distinctions. The question 
arose whether an automated bus ticketing machine, 
a thermalcycler and a DNA analyser were ‘computers’ 
and consequently whether the bus ticket produced by 
the automated ticketing machine and the DNA analysis 
laboratory reports were ‘computer generated documents’. 
The accused, Hanafi bin Mat Hassan, was charged with 
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rape and murder. A bus ticket bought by the accused, 
which was produced by a ticket machine, was adduced 
by the prosecution. Its production was objected to by the 
defence counsel as being computer generated evidence. 
The High Court adopted the Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Gnanasegaran, and held that the ticket machines 
installed on the buses were computers. Prosecution 
witnesses were called to give evidence to the effect that 
the ticket machines recorded and stored information and 
produced tickets, status reports, shift reports, and audit 
reports. Thus they were ‘devices for recording, storing, 
and producing information’ and the ticket, as well as the 
information printed on it, was admissible as evidence. On 
appeal, the defence contended that the tickets, as well as 
the DNA profiling laboratory reports, were inadmissible 
because both were ‘computer generated documents’ and 
therefore required a certificate under s 90A(2). The Court 
of Appeal took great pains to clarify the provisions of s 
90A, in particular that the subsections under s 90A could 
not be read disjunctively but had to be read together. It 
stated that:
‘a careful perusal of s.90A(1) reveals that in order for a 
document produced by a computer to be admitted in 
evidence it must have been produced by the computer 
“in the course of its ordinary use”. It is therefore a 
condition precedent to be established before such 
a document can be admitted in evidence under 
s.90A(1). The manner of establishing this condition 
has been prescribed. It can be proved by tendering 
in evidence a certificate as stipulated by s.90A(2) 
read with s.90A(3). Once the certificate is tendered 
in evidence the presumption contained in s.90A(4) 
is activated to establish that the computer referred 
to in the certificate was in good working order and 
was operating properly in all respects throughout the 
material part of the period during which the document 
was produced. Section 90A(4) must therefore be given 
its full effect as it has a significant role to play in the 
interpretation and application of s.90A. Ordinarily 
a certificate under s.90A(2) must be tendered in 
evidence in order to rely on the provisions of s.90A(3) 
and (4). However, the use of the words “may be 
proved” in s.90A(2) indicates that the tendering of a 
certificate is not a mandatory requirement in all cases. 
Thus the use of the certificate can be substituted 
with oral evidence as demonstrated in R v. Shepherd 
[1993] 1 All ER 225 in dealing with a provision of law 
similar to s.90A. It follows that where oral evidence 
is adduced to establish the requirements of s.90A(1) 
in lieu of the certificate the presumptions attached to 
it, in particular, the matters presumed under s.90A(4) 
must also be proved by oral evidence. … The resultant 
matter for consideration is the proper meaning to be 
ascribed to the “deeming” provision in s.90A(6) in 
order to determine whether it can be a substitute for 
the certificate. A deeming provision is a legal fiction 
and is used to create an artificial construction of a 
word or phrase in a statute that would not otherwise 
prevail. … Its primary function is to bring in something 
which would otherwise be excluded … the purpose 
of tendering in evidence a certificate under s.90A(2) 
is to establish that a document was produced by a 
computer in the ordinary course of its use. On the 
other hand s.90A(6) deems a document produced by 
a computer to have been produced by the computer in 
the course of its ordinary use. They are incompatible 
and inconsistent with each other. Every effort must 
thus be made to reconcile both the sub-sections in 
order to avoid a conflict between them…. S.90A(6) 
must have some other purpose to serve. S.90A(6) can 
only apply to a document which was not produced 
by a computer in the ordinary course of its use, or, 
in other words, to a document which does not come 
within the scope of s.90A(1).’
The members of the Court of Appeal held that the ticket 
from the automated ticketing machine was a ‘computer 
generated document’. It was correctly admitted into 
evidence, although the trial judge failed to appreciate 
the need for oral evidence to satisfy sub-section (4). 
However, the oral evidence of prosecution witness 25 
(PW25) had been sufficient to prove the proper working 
of the ticketing machine, and that it was produced in its 
‘ordinary course’, thus satisfying both section 90A(1) and 
sub-section (4).
On the issue of the DNA laboratory report, these 
were documents produced by DNA analysers and a 
thermalcycler. These were found to be ‘computers’ within 
the meaning of the definition of ‘computer’ in s 3 of the 
Evidence Act 1950. Exhibit P17 involved more than one 
computer in its production. The question arose whether 
all the computers were involved or only one of them and, 
if so, which one must be proved for the purposes of s 90A. 
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Section 3 provides that where two or more computers 
carry out the function of recording, storing, processing, 
retrieving or producing any information, as in this case, 
they are treated as a single computer. Considering the 
requisite proof, the Court of Appeal held that what was 
relevant for the prosecution was not the document 
produced by the computer (exhibit P17), but the 
statements contained in it. The distinction is recognised 
by s 90A. The Court of Appeal thus pointed out that what 
was required to be established in order to comply with s 
90A was the condition of the computers that produced the 
results as contained in exhibit P17, and not the computer 
itself which produced exhibit P17. In the absence of a 
certificate having been tendered in evidence under s 
90A(2), the oral evidence of prosecution witness 11 (PW11) 
was found to be sufficient to establish the condition 
precedent contained in s 90A(1). However, there had to be 
further oral evidence in lieu of the presumptions attached 
to a certificate to satisfy s 90A(4) that the computer was 
in good working order, and that it was operating properly 
in all respects throughout the material part of the period 
during which the document was produced. Although 
the prosecution did not lead any evidence in proof of 
these matters, the Court of Appeal found that the cross-
examination of PW11 by the defence had put on record the 
required evidence. The conviction of the appellant was 
upheld.
In PP v Goh Hoe Cheong & Anor [2007] 7 CLJ 68, the 
admissibility of ‘computer generated’ baggage tags were 
successfully challenged by the defence. Two accused 
were charged under s 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs 
Act 1952 for trafficking, which is punishable with death 
under s 39B(2). Here, the issue was the continuity of the 
chain of evidence. The prosecution unsuccessfully sought 
to adduce electronically produced check-in baggage tags 
in evidence. The facts were that, based on information 
received, a team of police personnel planned to capture 
three suspects when they were about to board their flight 
at Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA). At 9pm, 
the prosecution’s witness, described as ‘PW8’, and his 
police team took their respective positions at KLIA. The 
suspects checked in their bags and had a blue ribbon 
tied to each of their baggage handles. They then left the 
check-in counter and proceeded to the departure gate for 
their flight at the Satellite Building. The police personnel 
followed but did not arrest them either before or after 
the three suspects had passed through Immigration 
and Passport Control, or stop them from boarding the 
aerotrain to proceed to the Satellite Building.
It was only when the bags of the three suspects arrived 
at the baggage assembly area, prior to loading on to 
the aeroplane at 10.35pm, that PW8 detained them and 
gathered them together in front of departure Gate C14. 
He then took them below the aerobridge to his team 
mates who were with the three bags. The men were 
subsequently brought to the Narcotics Department 
where a physical body examination and an examination 
of their belongings was conducted. A physical check of 
the accused revealed nothing. The baggage keys were 
obtained from the trouser pocket of the accused, and the 
bags were opened, searched, the interior lining cut and 
drugs found.
The issues before the court were whether there was 
admissible evidence before the court, and whether the 
prosecution had adduced prima facie evidence that the 
accused had custody and control of the bags. The court 
found the following: 
(1) The police had allowed the suspects to board 
the aerotrain to proceed to the departure gate 
to board their scheduled flight without a hint of 
any imminent arrest. In the meantime, PW8 had 
left his position at the vicinity of the check-in 
counter E14 and proceeded to departure Gate C14 
Satellite Building KLIA. He did not seize the bags 
of the suspects from the airport personnel who 
processed the check-in, at the check-in counter 
itself.
(2) There was no evidence given by the authority 
responsible for the management of the airport 
or the air carrier concerned, giving rise to serious 
doubts whether the exhibit bags were in fact 
the same bags checked in at counter E14 by the 
accused, notwithstanding the carrier’s baggage 
tags were found attached to the bags, and the 
baggage claim tags attached to the respective 
tickets of the first and second accused, found in 
their possession. In fact and in law, in the absence 
of any express provisions as soon as a passenger 
checks in his bag at the check-in counter for his 
scheduled flight, the bag was in the custody and 
control of the carrier or its agents, until the same is 
claimed by the passenger, and the bag thereupon 
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delivered to the passenger.
(3) There was no evidence that the packages 
suspected of containing drugs found in the bags 
had been concealed by the accused, since there 
was no fingerprints of either of the accused on 
any of the packages, and no witness from the 
carrier or the authority managing KLIA called by 
the prosecution to prove the physical checking-
in of the bags by the first and second accused. 
Therefore, the computer generated documents i.e. 
the baggage tags P6A, P23A and the respective 
baggage claim tags P16A and P31A, could not be 
admitted in evidence unless s 90A of the Evidence 
Act 1950 was complied with by the prosecution.
(4) No certificate was tendered to the court signed 
by a person who either before or after the 
production of the documents by the computer was 
responsible for the management of the operation 
of that computer, or for the conduct of the 
activities for which that computer was used.
In the circumstances, the baggage tags were inadmissible 
as evidence. Therefore, there was no admissible evidence 
before this court. As the chain of custody and control had 
not been established, there was no admissible evidence 
that the bags were in the custody and control of the 
accused, either at the time they were arrested by PW8 at 
the departure Gate C14, or at any time before the bags 
were checked-in.
In Ahmad Najib A ris v PP [2009] 2 CLJ 800, the Federal 
Court dealt with the vexing issue of the distinction 
between s 90A subsections (1) and (6). The issue arose as 
to whether CCTV audio video recordings were documents 
produced by a computer, and if so the manner of proving, 
and whether a presumption arose under s 90A(6) as to 
whether a computer was used in its ‘ordinary course’. 
The appellant was convicted of rape and murder in the 
High Court. For the offence of rape, he was sentenced to 
20 years’ imprisonment and to 20 strokes of the cane. 
In respect of the murder, he was sentenced to death. On 
appeal the Court of Appeal maintained the High Court’s 
convictions and sentences.
The appellant appealed further to the Federal Court 
on various grounds, amongst others the admissibility 
of documents produced by a computer pursuant to s 
90A of the Evidence Act 1950 being of interest here. On 
the question of admissibility of ‘computer generated 
documents’, the Federal Court adopted the decisions in 
Gnansegaran, and Hanafi Mat Hassan. The Federal Court 
first addressed the issue of whether the CCTV recordings 
were ‘documents’ produced by a ‘computer’. They found 
that a CCTV tape clearly falls within the definitions of 
‘document’ under s 3 of the Evidence Act 1950 which 
includes ‘disc, tape, film, sound track and any visual 
recording whether of still or moving images’ and others. 
A ‘computer’ is defined in the same section as ‘any device 
for recording, storing processing, retrieving or producing 
any information or other matter, or for performing any 
one or more of those functions, by whatever name or 
description such device is called’. It therefore meant that 
the CCTV tapes (P19A-D) must satisfy the requirements 
of s 90A Evidence Act 1950 before they can be admitted 
in evidence. As this had not been done, they were 
inadmissible.
The Federal Court then went on to examine the 
distinction between the provisions under s 90A(1) and 
the presumption set out in s 90A(6). Section 90A(1) 
deals with the admissibility of a document which was 
produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary use. 
However, s 90A(6) of the Evidence Act 1950 deals with the 
admissibility of a document which was not produced by 
a computer in the course of its ordinary use, and is only 
deemed to be so. The question then arises whether the 
presumption in s 90A(6) can be a substitute for the strict 
requirements of s 90A(1).
Under s 90A(1), there is a condition precedent that 
in order for a document produced by a computer to be 
admitted in evidence, it must have been produced by the 
computer ‘in the course of its ordinary use’. This can be 
proven by tendering in evidence a certificate as stipulated 
by s 90A(2) read in conjunction with s 96A(3). Once the 
certificate is tendered in evidence, the presumption 
contained in s 90A(4) is activated to establish that the 
computer referred to in the certificate was in good 
working order and was operating properly. However, the 
use of the words ‘may be proved’ in s 90A(2) indicates 
that the tendering of a certificate is not a mandatory 
requirement in all cases, and can be substituted with oral 
evidence, as clarified in Gnanasegaran, following the 
English case of R v Shepherd. In such event, the matters 
presumed under s 90A(4) must also be proved by oral 
evidence.
On the other hand, s 90A(6) ‘deems’ a document 
produced by a computer to have been produced by the 
computer ‘in the course of its ordinary use’. The Federal 
Court held that a fact cannot be ‘deemed’ to have been 
proved when specific provision has been made for the 
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mode of proof of the same fact. The correct interpretation 
has to be that s 90A(6) deals with the admissibility of a 
document which was not produced by a computer ‘in the 
course of its ordinary use’ and is only ‘deemed’ to be so. 
Therefore the presumption contained in s 90A(6) can only 
be resorted to when the document was not produced 
by a computer ‘in the course of its ordinary use’. This 
could arise for instance where a letter is produced by 
the computer which has no bearing on the ordinary use 
of the computer. Yet it is still a document produced by a 
computer and could be admissible under s90A(6).
In this case, no certificate was tendered as required 
by s 90A(2) for proof of the chemist report (P83). 
Neither was any oral evidence adduced to show that the 
report was produced by a computer in the course of its 
ordinary use. It therefore remains that the only evidence 
available is that the report was produced by a computer. 
The oral evidence of prosecution witness 27(PW27) in 
cross examination is relevant, because he categorically 
stated that he could attest to the ‘computer’s ordinary 
use’ and its ‘proper working condition’. The contents 
of the chemist report (P83) directly established the 
appellant’s commission of the offence of rape and murder 
of the deceased. The linking evidence were DNA tests 
conducted on blood stains on a pair of jeans found in 
the appellant’s house as well as blood stains in the car 
driven by the appellant, both of which established the 
blood as the appellant’s. Vaginal swabs taken from the 
deceased during autopsy also established the semen as 
the appellant’s, and DNA tests on six strands of hair found 
in the car driven by the appellant also confirmed it to be 
that of the deceased. On this basis, the appellants earlier 
conviction was confirmed.
In Lau Chee Kai v PP [2011] 9 CLJ 619, the question 
arose as to whether the serial numbers of money that 
were keyed into a computer satisfied the requirements 
of s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950. The accused appealed 
against conviction under s 5 of the Kidnapping Act 1961 
for kidnapping one Seow Wei Sheng, a seven year old 
minor (the victim). Ransom money of Ringgit Malaysia 
(RM) 5 million was paid in Malaysian, Singapore and 
Brunei currencies by the victim’s father, prosecution 
witness 9 (PW9). The notes had been photocopied and 
handed to the police. PW9 testified that the Malaysian 
Ringgit were in RM50 and RM100 denominations, while 
the Singapore Dollars were in $50, $100 and $1,000 
denominations. He was unsure of the Brunei Dollar. He 
did not record the serial numbers of the notes. He also 
did not make any markings on the notes he photocopied. 
The photocopied copies of the notes were bound into 
five volumes which were produced by the prosecution as 
exhibits P12 (1-5). The accused was arrested while coming 
out of a bank in Petaling Jaya. Money was seized in 
various currencies – Malaysian Ringgit, Singapore Dollar, 
Hong Kong Dollar and Thailand Baht from the accused’s 
master bedroom. The Singapore currency seized were, 
one hundred $50 notes and five $1000 notes totaling 
$10,000. The serial numbers of the notes were keyed into 
the computer by prosecution witness 16 (PW16). This was 
printed and tendered by the prosecution as exhibit P71. 
According to PW16, the serial numbers of 60 of the 105 
Singapore Dollar notes seized from the accused’s master 
bedroom tallied with the serial numbers of some of the 
ransom money. The amount involved was $7,750. PW16 
testified that only three fourths of the ransom money was 
photocopied. Her investigations revealed that $2.3 million 
in Singapore and Brunei Dollars and RM650,000 were 
paid as ransom money. The accused’s wife testified that 
she had obtained the Singapore currency from a money 
changer to be used for the treatment of the accused’s 
father in Singapore, who was suffering from a lung illness. 
One of the issues before the Court of Appeal was whether 
the Singapore currencies seized from the accused’s house 
were part of the ransom money. PW16 had not compared 
the money seized with exhibit P12 (1-5), but with exhibit 
P71 to find out whether the seized money was part of the 
ransom money.
Counsel for the defence challenged the admissibility 
of exhibit P71 (being a computer print-out) under s 
90A of Evidence Act 1950 on the grounds that first, the 
serial numbers of the money found in exhibit P12 (1-
5) were keyed in into the computer by PW16 and one 
Inspector Salwani over a period of two months. Only 
PW16 gave evidence. Inspector Salwani was not called 
to give evidence. Second, since the prosecution had not 
tendered a certificate under s 90A(2) of the Evidence Act 
1950, it had not proved that the computer used by PW16 
and Inspector Salwani was in the course of its ordinary 
use. The Court of Appeal considered the earlier cases of 
Gnanasegaran, Hanafi Mat Hassan v PP, as well as the 
Federal Court’s decision in Ahmad Najib A ris v PP, and 
held exhibit P71 to be admissible under s 90A. They found 
that PW16 had testified that exhibit P71 was a document 
produced by a computer and that she and Inspector 
Salwani had keyed in the data into the computer. 
Although the prosecution had not tendered a certificate 
under s 90A(2) of the Evidence Act and PW16 did not say 
whether exhibit P71 was produced by a computer in the 
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course of its ordinary use, the prosecution, in view of the 
authorities cited earlier, could resort to the presumption 
under s 90A(6), which provides that a document produced 
by a computer shall be deemed to be produced by the 
computer in the course of its ordinary use. However, the 
appeal was successful and the conviction set aside on 
a different ground, and that it was unclear whether the 
learned trial judge had adequately evaluated the evidence 
adduced by the defence, because he had not given any 
reasons for rejecting it.
In Navi & Map Sdn. Bhd.v Twincie Sdn. Bhd. & Ors 
[2011] 7 CLJ 764, the certificate produced pursuant to 
s 90A Evidence Act 1950 was challenged. The plaintiff 
claimed copyright infringement over a set of compiled 
and published map data both in print and digital format 
entitled the ‘5th Edition, Street Directory of Kuala 
Lumpur and Klang Valley’. It claimed that the defendants, 
without its consent and authority, had substantially 
reproduced, manufactured and or sold the map data 
and the related digital maps to the public – particularly 
the seventh defendant, Navteq North America LLC. 
The seventh defendant was not named in the suit. The 
plaintiff obtained an ex parte Anton Pillar orders against 
the first to sixth defendants and confiscated copies of all 
documents, image digital maps and computer copy files in 
computers, laptop computers, a server and screen shots 
of a File Transfer Protocol server from the first defendant’s 
premises. The seventh defendant, who was not named 
in the suit, voluntarily subjected itself to intervene in the 
suit and counter claimed for injunctive relief, declaratory 
order, damages and costs against the plaintiff for 
copyright infringement of its copyright protected works 
seized from the first defendant’s premises. The fifth 
defendant also counter claimed against the plaintiff for 
constructively dismissing her. In its claim for infringement 
of its copyright, the plaintiff in its claim relied on the 
following: 
(i) Schedule 1 was the statutory declaration sworn by 
the plaintiff’s former director and chief operating 
officer, Mr Owatari Hideo (‘PW5’) pursuant to s 42 
of the Copyright Act 1987;
(ii) Schedule 2 was a list of employees listing their 
names, jobs done, dates of completion and 
commencement for the creation of the copyrighted 
material; and
(iii) Schedule 3 contained names, National 
Registration Identity Card numbers, job 
responsibilities for map number and map 
reference, date of commencement and completion.
The plaintiff failed in its copyright infringement claim, 
because there was no prima facie evidence to show that 
the plaintiff was the copyright owner of the work. In the 
declaration sworn, PW5 said that the maps and data were 
completed by certain personnel. However, the plaintiff 
failed to exhibit the actual work carried out by these 
personnel and, thus, the declaration sworn was defective 
and did not comply with s 42(1)(a) of the Act.
The plaintiff tendered a ‘skype chat’ between 
the defendant witnesses as evidence of copyright 
infringement. The plaintiff produced a certificate (‘exhibit 
P29’) pursuant to s 90A E A1950 for admission of the print-
out of the chat, duly signed by a digital evidence specialist 
from the Digital Forensic Department in Cyber Security 
(‘PW4’). However, exhibit P29 was not a valid certificate 
under s 90A, due to the fact that it certified that PW4 
was not the officer responsible for the management and 
analysis process of the computer that produced the skype 
chats. Furthermore, the certificate did not certify that 
the document was produced in the course of its ordinary 
use or that it was in good working order. It was also 
evidenced that portions of the skype chat were missing. 
For these reasons, the evidence of the skype chat did not 
aid the plaintiff in proving copyright infringement. The 
plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants had infringed 
the copyright, and the court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
application against all defendants with costs; dismissed 
the fifth defendant’s counter claim against plaintiff with 
costs; but allowed the seventh defendant’s counter claim 
against plaintiff with costs.
New developments
On 2 February 2012, further amendments were introduced 
to the Evidence Act by way of section 73AA and sections 
90D, 90E and 90F under the Evidence (Amendment)(No.1) 
Act 2012. Although these amendments do not specifically 
refer to computer evidence, it would operate to include 
computer evidence. These amendments are aimed to 
compliment the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 
2002. Section 73AA provides for a pre-trial agreement in 
writing between the parties agreeing to the admission of 
specified evidence. Where such agreement is signed, no 
proof of such evidence shall be required. This therefore 
operates as an opt-in proviso ensuring that the evidence 
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will not be challenged. The amendments under section 
90D facilitate the admission in criminal proceedings 
of evidence obtained under the Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act 2002 without further proof of any 
fact stated in the testimony albeit with certain safeguards. 
Section 90D(2) stipulates that the testimony, statement 
or deposition shall be taken on oath or affirmation, under 
an obligation to tell the truth or under caution as would be 
accepted, by courts in the foreign country concerned, for 
the purposes of giving testimony in proceedings before 
those courts.
Subsection (3) requires authentication of such evidence 
by being signed or certified by a judge, magistrate or 
officer in or of the foreign country to which the request 
was made; and bear an official or public seal of the 
foreign country or department. Subsection (4) provides 
that such certificate pursuant to subsection (3) shall be 
admitted in the proceedings as conclusive evidence of 
the facts contained in the certificate, and subsection 
(5) provides that judicial notice shall be taken of it. 
Once again, these provisions are designed to ensure 
that the evidence cannot be challenged by the defence. 
Subsection (6) provides that the testimony taken under 
subsection (2) may be reduced to writing or be recorded 
on a tape, disk or other device from which sounds or 
images are capable of being reproduced or may be taken 
by means of technology that permits the virtual presence 
of the person in Malaysia. Subsection (7) requires such 
evidence under subsection (6) to be authenticated as 
provided under subsection (3). Subsection (8) deems 
such video or testimony by other means which permits 
the virtual presence of the person in Malaysia, to 
have been given in Malaysia. This would facilitate the 
admission of teleconferencing or video conferencing 
testimony, as in the 2010 test case of a 16-year-old rape 
victim who was allowed to testify via live ‘video link’ in 
a Sessions Court. On an appeal on the point, the High 
Court held that the video link did not amount to ‘recorded 
evidence’ as it was a ‘live’ video link.5  Subsection (9) 
clarifies that the testimony, statement or deposition need 
not be in the form of an affidavit; or constitute a transcript 
of a proceeding in a foreign court. Finally, subsection (10) 
ensures the admissibility of such evidence, and provides 
that the court has no discretion to exclude it. In relation 
to evidence from foreign jurisdictions, s 90F ensures its 
admissibility, provided it is tendered with a certificate of 
authorisation from the Attorney General.
A new section, s 114A, in the Evidence (Amendment)
(No.2) Act 20126 has introduced a presumption of fact 
applicable in both civil and criminal proceedings in 
respect of publication through the internet. In order to 
facilitate the identification and proving of the identity of 
an anonymous person involved in publication through the 
internet subsection (1) provides that:
(1) A person whose name, photograph or pseudonym 
appears on any publication depicting himself as 
the owner, host, administrator, editor or sub-
editor, or who in any manner facilitates to publish 
or re-publish the publication is presumed to have 
published or re-published the contents of the 
publication unless the contrary is proved.
This means if X creates a blog in Ys name, or posts 
something ‘offensive’ or ‘sensitive’ on Y’s web page or 
social network site, Y is deemed to have published it. 
Victims of hacking and identity theft would have to bear 
the evidential burden of proving otherwise.
Subsection (2) provides:
(2) A person who is registered with a network service 
provider as a subscriber of a network service on 
which any publication originates from is presumed 
to be the person who published or re-published 
the publication unless the contrary is proved.
The provisions of this subsection has grave 
consequences. If a posting is found to originate from Y’s 
account with a network service provider, Y is deemed 
to be the publisher unless Y is able to prove otherwise. 
Thus people sharing an internet account, or giving access 
to third parties had better beware, because the account 
holder will be held liable unless the contrary can be 
proved.
Subsection (3) provides:
(3) Any person who has in his custody or control any 
computer on which any publication originates from 
is presumed to have published or re-published the 
content of the publication unless the contrary is 
proved.
Here again if a publication is traced to a computer either 
owned by or over which Y had custody and control, Y will 
be deemed to be the publisher of any material found on it 
unless Y can prove otherwise.
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Subsection (4) further provides that for the purpose of 
this section:
(a) “network service” and “network service provider” 
have the meaning assigned to them in section 6 of 
the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 [Act 
588]; and 
(b) “publication” means a statement or a 
representation, whether in written, printed, 
pictorial, film, graphical, acoustic or other form 
displayed on the screen of a computer”. 
The section which clearly favours the prosecutor, and 
has caused great public anxiety, especially among social 
network users. The rational for the amendment was 
that it was difficult to trace the source of an anonymous 
postings because even though there was an aggrieved 
party, no cause of action could be pursued, as there was 
no evident publisher of the content. This is not necessarily 
so, because there are procedural means for obtaining the 
necessary information.
For instance, in Stemlife Bhd. v Bristol-Myers Squibb 
(M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 CLJ, the plaintiff applied for pre-
action discovery against the defendant for defamatory 
postings on the defendant’s web site and in an external 
blog linked to the defendant’s web forum by two 
users of the forum operating under the pseudonyms 
‘stemlie’ and ‘kakalily’. The plaintiff sought a Norwich 
Pharmacal6  order against the defendants for the identity 
of the users, and contended that the defendant should 
have the relevant information, because the users were 
registered with the defendant and would have provided 
their particulars upon registration. In granting the order 
sought, the High Court explained that the question 
before the court was not whether the defendant was 
liable for the same wrong against the plaintiff as that 
committed by the users with the pseudonyms ‘stemlie’ 
and ‘kakalily’, but whether the defendant facilitated their 
wrongdoing. There was evidence that the defendant’s 
web site contained terms and conditions that reserved the 
defendant’s editorial rights to edit or completely remove 
postings on the web site at its sole discretion without 
prior notice or explanation. Hence, it was found that the 
defendant, by providing and controlling the web site that 
enabled defamatory materials or hyperlinks to be posted 
freely with no editorial editing, clearly facilitated the 
wrongdoing.
With the operation of section 114, a plaintiff in a similar 
situation could now directly seek redress against the web 
site hosts. The onus would be on the defendants to use 
their resources to identify the bloggers of the offensive 
postings and join them in the proceedings and prove that 
they are not the publishers.
Conclusion
The provisions of s 90A Evidence Act 1950 have clearly 
facilitated the use of ‘computer generated evidence’ 
in the Malaysian courts. However, despite the recent 
amendments to the Evidence Act in 2012, it is noted 
that the legislature has not seen the need to amend the 
‘computer’ specific language of the statute to the more 
neutral term of ‘electronic’ or ‘digital’. As such questions 
of whether ‘documents’ from a particular equipment are 
‘computer generated’ will continue to arise. The two major 
issues that arose in practice being whether a ‘certificate’ 
under subsection (2) had to be mandatorily produced in 
every case, and whether subsection (6) could be used 
to circumvent the provisions of subsection (1) have been 
clearly addressed by the courts.
However, equally clearly, the distinction between 
authenticity and admissibility has not been appreciated 
by the courts or by the lawyers who try to challenge the 
admissibility of certain ‘computer generated documents’. 
Meanwhile, the latest amendments to the Evidence 
Act 1950 have far reaching consequences, because it is 
weighed heavily in favour of the prosecution, making the 
challenging of the evidence virtually impossible. It would 
be better if an opt-in provision similar to s 73AA could 
be introduced for all actions, whether civil or criminal, 
providing for a pre-trial agreement in writing between the 
parties agreeing to the admission of specified evidence at 
the trial.
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